Germany as a Hub: Logistical Resilience between Operational Planning and Regulatory Frameworks

The transformation of the security environment has fundamentally reshaped the foundations of defence planning in Europe. Whereas international missions abroad were the primary focus over the past two decades, national and collective defence (LV/BV) now predominates on the security policy agenda. For the defence industry and the associated civilian sector, this shift brings to the fore a set of issues that had long been regarded as secondary: logistics. In addition to questions of capacity and management, matters relating to liability and insurance law – for example in connection with delays, damage-causing incidents or the use of private infrastructure for military purposes – are therefore gaining significantly in importance.

With the finalisation of the second version of the ‘Operations Plan Germany (O-Plan DEU)’, scheduled for mid-2026, it becomes unmistakably clear that the Federal Republic of Germany’s geostrategic role within the alliance structure is primarily logistical. In the event of heightened tensions and/or a defence scenario, Germany will serve as a central ‘hub’ for the transit, accommodation and supply of up to 800,000 NATO soldiers within a six‑month period. This entails far‑reaching requirements for coordination between military operational planning, national and European transport and infrastructure legislation, and export control regulations – for example, in relation to the transit, transhipment and temporary storage of defence‑related goods.

For industry and logistics , this will give rise to significant operational, strategic and regulatory challenges over the next three to five years. Companies must adapt their governance and compliance structures to the specific requirements of security‑relevant supply chains, for example by establishing clear rules on responsibilities, internal control mechanisms and coordinated crisis and emergency plans. At the same time, employment law issues – particularly those relating to the deployment of reservists and the safeguarding of business continuity in the event of staff shortages – must be integrated into corporate planning at an early stage.

Dual-use challenges: capacity management and the involvement of private actors

The central premise of the O-Plan DEU is that comprehensive defence constitutes a responsibility of both the state and society as a whole. As the Bundeswehr does not possess sufficient transport and storage capacities of its own to manage logistical tasks of this magnitude independently, it is fundamentally reliant on the structured involvement of the private sector. This necessitates the early conclusion of contractual framework agreements, a clear delineation of responsibilities, and coordinated governance and compliance structures between public authorities and private undertakings.

Contractual operational readiness and availability in the event of a crisis:

The involvement of private companies in defence logistics must not be confined to abstract capacity commitments. Rather, contractual and organisational arrangements are required to ensure that the services promised can, in fact, be mobilised and delivered even under rapidly changing crisis conditions. This applies in particular to logistics service providers, infrastructure operators, suppliers and operators of critical logistics hubs.

Contractual arrangements should therefore not only define the nature and scope of the services to be provided, but in particular establish clear activation and escalation mechanisms, prioritisation rules, duties to inform and to cooperate, as well as decision-making powers for short-term adjustments. It must also be determined how government-initiated or prioritised services relate to existing civilian supply and transport obligations, and what consequences official orders, capacity constraints or the failure of critical upstream services have for the service obligations of the parties involved.

In the event of a crisis or defence situation, statutory instruments for the requisitioning and prioritisation of transport services may come into effect (traditionally referred to as ‘precautionary clauses’ (“Vorsorgeklauseln”), Form B077 of the Federal Ministry of Defence, issued on the basis of the Security of Supply and Precautionary Measures Acts). By resolution of 1 July 2026, the Federal Ministry of Defence (BMVg) and the Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI) presented key points for the amendment of the Security of Supply and Precautionary Measures Acts. To strengthen defence, the Federal Ministry of the Interior is coordinating needs-based resource planning for its own and allied armed forces, whereby, in addition to the early application of legislation, long-term precautionary measures such as stockpiling and infrastructure adaptations in peacetime are also being examined. The effectiveness of these regulations is being evaluated by the ministries, tested in a new series of joint exercises, and prioritised with a focus on securing water, food and healthcare provision. In addition, the legislation is being adapted to hybrid threats, to Germany’s role as a logistical hub for NATO, and to the digital transformation through the integration of software and IT services, with a view to enabling a Cabinet decision by 2027.

Irrespective of this, it is necessary, in advance, to establish a robust contractual allocation of standby, procurement, liability and insurance risks. In particular, this should encompass provisions on remuneration for reserved capacities, force majeure and adjustment scenarios, limitations of liability in the event of crisis-related service disruptions, and supplementary insurance requirements.

Multi-tiered supply chains are of particular significance. Where appropriate, obligations relating to security, availability, information and cooperation must be effectively cascaded to subcontractors. Otherwise, there is a risk that the main contractor’s promised performance capacity will be undermined by a lack of capacity, rights or authorisations at downstream levels. Contractual operational readiness therefore requires not only the physical availability of resources, but also the legal and organisational capability to mobilise them at short notice and across the entire service chain.

Operational resilience (KRITIS):

Companies that form part of this logistics chain are subject to increasingly stringent regulatory requirements for the protection of critical infrastructure. In practical terms, this entails that investments in physical hardening, redundant emergency power supplies and measures to mitigate staff shortages (for example, through the mobilisation of reservists) must be borne by the private sector and planned with appropriate legal foresight. In addition, labour law provisions concerning the release of key personnel, emergency and shift schedules, as well as internal compliance guidelines for fulfilling reporting and documentation obligations under KRITIS and IT security legislation, must be implemented.

Security vetting and confidentiality as operational access requirements

The involvement of private companies in defence-related logistics structures may, in addition to general confidentiality and IT security requirements, also give rise to specific obligations regarding the protection of personnel-related and material classified information. This applies in particular where companies or individual employees are granted access to classified information, are involved in security-sensitive projects, or are required to process information concerning military movements, capabilities, locations and supply structures.

This applies not only to traditional defence industry undertakings. Logistics service providers, port and airport operators, rail and other infrastructure companies, IT providers, maintenance enterprises and further subcontractors may likewise be integrated into security-sensitive processes. Depending on the subject matter and security classification of a given contract, this may necessitate the security vetting of employees, clearly defined rules on responsibilities and representation, physical security measures, and detailed guidelines governing the storage, processing and disclosure of classified information.

Security clearance is therefore not merely a subordinate confidentiality requirement; it may already determine whether a company is eligible to perform certain services, is granted access to the requisite information, and is legally permitted to execute a contract. Companies should accordingly identify at an early stage which functions, locations, IT systems and external service providers are to be involved in security-sensitive processes, and assess whether their existing personnel, organisational and technical structures are sufficient for this purpose.

Particular challenges also arise in international supply chains organised on the basis of the division of labour. Access to information must be restricted strictly in accordance with the principle of necessity; its disclosure to third parties must be controlled through contractual and organisational measures; and the involvement of individuals or companies that have not been adequately vetted must be prevented. Security vetting and confidentiality requirements must therefore be taken into account at the earliest possible stage of project planning, when selecting contractual partners, and when designing procurement and subcontracting structures.

Digitalisation and cyber resilience in the logistics supply chain

Modern military logistics no longer depends solely on physical means of transport such as containers and railways, but to a considerable extent on software-based control and planning systems. Concepts such as ‘Software-Defined Defence (SDD)’ exert a profound influence on logistical planning and control mechanisms and, in doing so, also reshape responsibilities and interfaces between state and private actors. At the same time, the threat posed by hybrid warfare, sabotage and targeted ransomware attacks on key hubs such as ports, signal boxes and freight centres is increasing significantly. In practice, this necessitates coordinated emergency and recovery plans, clear contractual provisions on IT security, and a precise allocation of liability and insurance risks.

IT supply chain risk:

Logistics companies must be able to demonstrate that their IT infrastructure is sufficiently robust to withstand even state-sponsored cyber-attacks. Regulatory requirements such as NIS-2 and the IT Security Act impose strict minimum technical and organisational standards in this regard. In addition, contractual assurances to clients – for example, concerning service levels, incident reporting and forensic investigation – are becoming increasingly important. In this context, issues relating to third-party liability, cyber insurance and the outsourcing of IT services (including cloud and managed services) must also be carefully structured from a legal perspective.

Transatlantic regulation:

German logistics providers and suppliers that interact with the US armed forces or American ‘primes’ (prime contractors) are increasingly subject to scrutiny by the US Department of Defense (DoD). The classification of certain software or AI components as a national security risk (pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 3252) is compelling European market participants to undergo highly restrictive software and data compliance audits in order to avoid exclusion from transatlantic supply chains. In addition, export control and sanctions regimes – in particular ITAR/EAR – may already apply to seemingly minor logistical support services. Companies must therefore design their contractual and governance frameworks in such a way that potential conflicts between European data protection and foreign trade law, on the one hand, and US security requirements, on the other, are identified and managed at an early stage.

Public procurement framework and procurement under time pressure

In order to achieve the ambitious objectives of the O-Plan over the next 36 to 60 months, infrastructure – ranging from railway lines and bridge load classes to fuel depots – must be substantially expanded and upgraded within a compressed timeframe. German and European public procurement law frequently constitutes a bottleneck in this context, as transparency and competition requirements must be reconciled with the imperative of expedited procedures. In practice, further questions arise regarding the legally compliant design of long-term framework agreements under public procurement law, permissible cooperation models between private infrastructure operators and public contracting authorities, and the assessment under competition law of joint procurement or standardisation initiatives.

Emergency procurement:

Whilst the derogations under Article 346 TFEU (safeguarding essential security interests) and accelerated procedures under public procurement law offer considerable flexibility, their legally secure application in the field of purely logistical support services – which are frequently of a civilian nature – remains highly contentious and must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. In addition, there are complex issues of delineation in relation to budgetary requirements and state aid thresholds, particularly where certain operators of critical infrastructure are to be given preferential treatment. Contracting authorities and companies are therefore required to establish decision-making processes that are robust in terms of documentation and compliance, in order to avoid subsequent review proceedings and liability risks.

Standardisation vs. customisation:

NATO is calling for greater interoperability. For logistics suppliers, this entails the provision of standardised goods that are compatible across national borders . This raises complex questions concerning intellectual property protection and licensing in multinational consortium projects . In practice, antitrust regulations must also be observed in joint standardisation initiatives in order to avoid unlawful restrictions on competition. Companies must design their contractual and governance frameworks in such a way that the protection of know-how, export control legislation and security requirements are reconciled with the demands of open, interoperable systems.

Conclusions and further action required

The next three to five years will reveal whether the German economic and legal framework is sufficiently adaptable to provide reliable support for the requirements of the Operations Plan Germany and to translate these into resilient structures. Logistics in the defence sector is no longer merely a matter of procurement; it has developed into a strategic, security-relevant management instrument that must be coordinated at the interfaces between public law, IT security, company law (including M&A due diligence in relation to sensitive logistics assets) and international foreign trade law. In addition, employment law issues – such as the integration of reservists and the organisation of on-call and shift arrangements – are increasingly coming into focus, as are liability and insurance frameworks for the operation of critical logistics hubs. In the absence of a coordinated governance and compliance architecture that systematically integrates these cross-cutting issues, there is a significant risk of operational inefficiencies and legal impediments.

Companies that structurally reinforce their supply chains at an early stage, proactively anticipate regulatory risks – including those arising from ITAR/EAR, the US supply chain regime and relevant EU export control regulations – and position themselves as reliable partners for national defence logistics are likely to benefit disproportionately from the forthcoming reorganisation. This presupposes that internal compliance systems, risk and crisis management, and contractual safeguards with public and private clients are specifically calibrated to scenarios involving heightened threat levels. Actors that set this course in good time will not only be able to mitigate their own vulnerabilities, but also make a substantial contribution to the overall resilience of society.